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Introduction
The book, Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy (1995), by Alfred R. 
Mele, deals primarily with two main concepts, “self-control” and “individual auton-
omy,” and the relationship between them. The book is divided into two parts: (1) a 
view of self-control, the self-controlled person, and behaviour manifesting self-con-
trol, and (2) a view of personal autonomy, the autonomous person, and autonomous 
behaviour. Mele (Ibid.) defines self-control as the opposite of the Aristotelian con-
cept of akrasia, or the contrary of akrasia, which implies weakness of will, incon-
tinence, or lack of self-control—the state of mind in which one acts against one’s 
better judgement. According to Mele, the concept of self-control can be approached 
from two perspectives: (a) how self-control affects human behaviour, and (b) how 
self-control-associated behavior can enhance our understanding of ‘personal auton-
omy’ and ‘autonomous behaviour’—personal autonomy requires self-control, and 
autonomous persons and autonomous behaviour are naturally found together. There-
fore, I might say that self-control is essential to enhancing one’s autonomy.
In part I, we find an account of self-control where Mele argues that even an ide-
ally self-controlled person might lack autonomy. In part II, Mele gives an explicit 
account of autonomy and explains what must be added to self-control to achieve 
autonomy. This is the pivotal claim made by Mele (dismantling the intuitively con-
nected notions of self-control and autonomy).
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Part I
The concepts of ‘self-control’ and ‘autonomy’ are used in a variety of senses. The 
term “autonomy” is derived from the two words: autos, which means ‘self,’ and 
nomos, which means ‘rule’ or ‘law.’ Thus, etymologically autonomy entails ‘self-
rule’ or ‘self-government,’ which seems to inherently imply self-control. From a 
metaphysical perspective, autonomy might be understood in terms of free will, free 
action, or free choice. Joel (1986, 28) states that ‘the meaning of autonomy,’ when 
applied to individual persons can be understood in a variety of ways, including (1) 
the capacity to govern oneself, (2) the actual condition of self-government, (3) an 
ideal character trait (a virtue) derived from that conception, or (4) the sovereign 
authority to govern oneself. All of these conceptions seem to imply self-control in 
some sense, either as a capacity, a condition, or a right.
A self-controlled person has some sort of personal autonomy and can be referred 
to an autonomous agent. Mele discusses what it means to be an autonomous person 
and to act autonomously, and the issue of whether the autonomous agency is open to 
us. In this context, he considers both compatibilist and incompatibilist approaches. 
Mele does not reconcile these viewpoints to understand the importance of personal 
autonomy.
By stipulative definition, ‘autonomy’ is a property possessed solely by ‘moral 
agents’ who engage in moral conduct. In the Nicomachean Ethics (Ross 1915, here-
after NE, 10.7), Aristotle (350 B.C.E)  refers to hypothetical gods as moral agents 
whose moral virtues are otiose—serving no practical purpose. Mele applies the term 
‘autonomy’ interchangeably with the concept of ‘freedom’. He has no theoretical 
need for an account of ‘autonomy’ that stipulatively limits the possession of auton-
omy to ‘moral agents.’ Just as there is no need to assert the existence of the will 
in arguing for the reality of ‘weakness of the will,’ it is similarly unnecessary to 
presuppose the existence of self-control in order to establish the reality of autono-
mous agency. He argues that even the person with ideal self-control can fall short 
of achieving of personal autonomy. The common notion that individual autonomy 
implies self-control may be more nominal than substantive, and depends on the 
extent to which its proponents share a conception of self-control.
For Mele, the account of self-control includes continent and incontinent behavior. 
With regard to the question of the continent, in chapter 7 of De Motu Animalium 
(NE, 701a7–8), Aristotle asks that “How does it happen that thinking is sometimes 
followed by action and sometimes not, sometimes by motion, sometimes not?” More 
specifically, psychiatrist Ainslie (1975, 463) contemplates, “why we sometimes pur-
sue the poorer, smaller, or more disastrous of two alternative rewards even when we 
seem to be completely familiar with the alternatives, and also why we seek the better 
or larger reward when we act.” Even in Delay of Gratification, psychologist Walter 
Mischel (1973) asks the same question.
The recent psychological literature on ‘self-control’ has been extensive and 
motivated both by theoretical concerns, e.g., delayed gratification, impulsive con-
duct, the motivational springs of action, and the place of cognition in the expla-
nation of motivated behavior, and by the practical problems, e.g., drug abuse, 
1 3
J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 
alcoholism, eating disorders, smoking, spending, phobias. We have seen that  for 
example, how ‘theory informs practice’ and is informed by observations of the 
results of practice. It seems to me that we need to create a balance between self-
monitoring (the act of observing or supervising something) and self-regulating 
(the act of self-activating or self-limiting) with respect to any act.
For Aristotle, akrasia is uncompelled, intentional behavior that acts against 
the agent’s best or better judgment (judgment to the effect that it would be best 
or better to do A than to do B). Enkrateia means self-control, continence, and 
strength of will—behavior that conforms to one’s best or better judgment in the 
face of temptation to act to the contrary. Aristotle (NE, 1150 a11–13) states that 
“the akratic person is in such a state as to be overcome even by those pleasures 
which most people master,” while a self-controlled person is able “to master even 
those by which most people are defeated.” Mele, like Aristotle, believes that self-
control and akrasia are two sides of the same coin. He views self-controlled indi-
viduals as agents who possess both significant motivation to conduct themselves 
as they judge best, and a strong capacity to act in the face of actual or anticipated 
competing motivation. Akratic individuals suffer from a deficiency in one or both 
of these connections (1995, 5). Mele considers the example of someone who is 
relatively self-controlled in a certain sphere of life. In a particularly taxing situ-
ation, such a person might succumb to temptation in that sphere, (A-ing) inten-
tionally and in the absence of compulsion, although he judges it best not to do 
so. Such behavior is considered akratic or incontinent, even if it manifests, not 
weakness of will or possessing subnormal powers of self-control (only an associ-
ated imperfection) (1987, 4). Likewise, an agent who suffers from akrasia may 
successfully exercise his modest powers of self-control and act in a continent 
manner.
Mele, unlike Aristotle, contends that agents may exhibit self-control not only 
over overt actions that correspond to their evaluative judgments—which include 
judgments having nothing to do with bodily appetites—but also in their acquisition 
or retention of beliefs. “Just as agents can act akratically, they can believe akrati-
cally, as in some cases of self-deception” (Ibid., Ch. 8). Aristotle views the con-
tinent or self-controlled agent as a person whose “desiring element” is ‘obedient’ 
to his ‘reason or rational principle,’ though less obedient than in virtuous persons 
(Ibid., NE, 1102 b26–28). He writes that “a person is said to have or not to have self-
control, according to whether his reason has or has not the control (kratein), on the 
assumption that this (reason) is the man himself” (Ibid., NE, 1168 b34–35). Given 
his contention that ‘reason more than anything else is man,’ Aristotle’s identifica-
tion of self-control with control by one’s “reason” is predictable. Mele’s view is that 
human being is more holistic in nature, and so, “the self of self-control is not prop-
erly identified with reason, it is, rather, to be identified with the person” (1995, 6). 
Mele expresses a conception of self-controlled individuals who are characteristically 
guided by their better or best judgment even in the face of strong competing motiva-
tion, but his view does not imply that emotion, passion, and the like have no place 
in the self of self-control. Mele, therefore, in contrast to Aristotle, claims that self-
control can be exercised in support of better judgment based in part on a person’s 
appetites or emotional commitments.
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According to Mele, self-controlled individuals need not be stoic or unemo-
tional (Ibid.). Their feelings, emotions, and appetites can influence their con-
ceptions of the good life or their systems of values. The better judgments that 
self-control serves in a particular self-controlled person may rest on a princi-
ple of practical reasoning that measures the importance of others on the basis 
of his emotional bonds with them. Like an Epicurean, the self-controlled per-
son makes judgments that depend significantly on their desires, values, loves, 
pleasures; therefore, a better judgment (a more autonomous judgement) derives 
from an agent’s own desires or passions, which motivate them. In this context, I 
would claim that a self-controlled person should be a mixture of both reason and 
passion—‘without reason, passion is senseless, and without passion, reason is 
worthless.’
Another of Mele’s books, Irrationality (1987), provides a partial understand-
ing of ‘how self-control can function at a certain crucial location in the genera-
tion of continent action,’ and it is based on the following two theses (Ibid., 7):
1. The motivational force of our desires is not always in line with our evaluation or 
assessment of the “objects” of our desires.
2. Decisive better judgments are formed on the basis of our evaluation or assessment 
of the objects of our desires.
On the one hand, thesis 1 has considerable empirical support confirmed by com-
mon experience and by various thought experiments. The strength of desire is 
influenced not only by our evaluation or assessment of objects of desire, but also 
by such things as the perceived proximity and prospects for desire satisfaction, 
the perceived or imagined importance of desired objects, and the manner in which 
we attend to desired objects. On the other hand, thesis 2 is a standard conception 
of practical reasoning. When we reason about what to do, we inquire not as to 
what we are most motivated to do, but rather what it would be “best” to do. Mele 
points out that “an agent can… refuse, at the time of action, to focus his attention 
on the attractive aspects of the envisioned akratic action and concentrate instead 
on what is to be accomplished by acting as he judges best. He can attempt to aug-
ment his motivation for performing the action judged best by promising himself a 
reward for doing so” (1987, 23). Thus, Mele asserts that self-control can be exer-
cised either through present motivation or through anticipated motivation.
Rorty (1980) makes the distinction that self-control may be either regional or 
global, and exists in degrees. An agent may exhibit remarkable self-control in 
one area of his life (e.g., eating), and be weak-willed in another (e.g., watching 
movies). Agents possessed of global self-control (self-control in all areas of their 
lives) would be particularly remarkable: in every area, their self-control would 
significantly exceed that of most people. Apparently, some self-controlled agents 
are more self-controlled than others.
Mele claims that being a self-controlled person is not enough for being an 
autonomous person. Autonomous agents possess and exercise some degree 
of control over their lives. In Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional 
1 3
J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 
Behavior, Mele develops a causal view of the explanation of intentional actions 
and argue that the most detailed completing anticausal theories fail. He claims 
that those who hold that autonomous decisions are uncaused (no causal/explana-
tory grounds)  should offer an account of deciding for reasons that they  do not 
treat the reasons for which we decide the causal production of the decision, that 
is, decision cannot play its explanatory role vis-à-vis intentional action unless it 
incorporates preponderant motivation, or one might advert to alleged meaning 
conventions about ‘decision.’ The term ‘decision’ has multiple referents. It refers 
(1) to act of deciding; (2) to the immediate issue of the act, a decision state, a 
state of being decided upon something; and (3) to what we decide, as in ‘his/her 
decision was to A’ (1992, 158). He suggests that it is difficult to consider how 
reasons can help to account for an agent’s decision to do A if those reasons do 
not play a causal role in the output of the decision. As we know that control is 
a causal phenomenon and that autonomous agents are viewed as being (at least 
to some degree) in control of what they decide to do, control is thus the capac-
ity to intend to act as one judges it best to act, or the ability to intend on the 
basis of one’s relevant evaluative judgments. Consider that an agent judges that 
his doing A would be morally better than his doing B, and yet, in the absence of 
coercion, he intentionally does B rather than A. In doing B, he need not be acting 
akratically, as he may judge that all things considered, his doing B would be bet-
ter than his doing A. Even in doing B, he may be acting continently. Therefore, 
Mele believes that akratic action is that which violates a decisive better judg-
ment (1987, 5–6)—an evaluation of what is best to do according to the subject’s 
self-defined grounds. For Mele, a judgment made by an agent is a decisive better 
judgment if and only if, in the agent’s mind (e.g., an agent’s own desires, beliefs), 
it is the better or best action given his circumstances, and not just in some respect 
or other (e.g., financially), but unconditionally.
Mele explains that the kind of akratic action (uncompelled intentional action) 
which is contrary to the agent’s decisive better judgment is a strict akratic action 
(Ibid., 7). Strict akratic actions seem to be an unfortunate fact of life, a mat-
ter complicated by our having at least two perspectives on the justification for 
intentional actions: motivational and intellectual (1995, 16). Central to the moti-
vational perspective is the idea that what agents do when they act intentionally 
depends on what they are most strongly motivated to do. Unlike motivational and 
intentional action, the intellectual perspective applies only to intellectual beings. 
Central to the intellectual perspective is the belief that better judgments play a 
substantial role in explaining the intentional actions of rational or intellectual 
beings. The motivational perspective is suited to akratic action, because when 
acting akratically, one most likely does what one is most strongly motivated 
to do at the moment. However, this threatens the intellectual perspective. We 
would prefer to say that the motivational and intellectual perspectives on inten-
tional human action includes choice, decision, evaluative judgment, motivational 
strength and intention at a particular time and situation. It depends on a subjec-
tive perspective of an individual.
In “How is Weakness of the Will Possible,” Donald Davidson (1969)  sets out 
three principles concerning the problem of the possibility of akratic action:
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P1:  If an agent wants to do x more than he wants to do y, and he believes himself 
free to do either x or y, then he will intentionally do x if he does either x or y 
intentionally.
P2:  If an agent judges that it would be better to do x than to do y, then he wants to 
do x more than he wants to do y.
P3:  There are incontinent actions.
P1 and P2 involve a close connection between better judgment and intentional 
action, but a connection that P3 seems to contravene. Davidson’s aim is to demon-
strate that the principles form a coherent relation. In this context, Pettit and Smith 
(1993, 53–54) address how the motivational and intellectual perspectives regard-
ing intentional action can be squared with each other. The motivational perspec-
tive links motivation to intentional action, i.e., P1, and the intellectual perspective 
links practical reasoning and evaluative judgments to intentional action , i.e., P2, 
whereas Davidson tries to square P1 and P2 with the occurrence of incontinent 
action, i.e., P3. For Davidson, his principles (P1 and P2) jointly imply the follow-
ing single argument:
P:  If an agent judges that it would be better to do x than to do y, and he believes 
himself free to do either x or y, then he will intentionally do x if he does either 
x or y intentionally.
This argument (P) might seem to preclude the possibility of akratic action. How-
ever, Davidson defines akratic action as that which clashes with all things consid-
ered to be better judgment—the akratic agent intentionally does B while judging 
it better to do A. But he does not (at the time of choosing) judge it better to do A. 
Hence, his action does not falsify P. But, for Mele, the agent may hold the judg-
ment that it is best to do A while no longer intending to do A. It is his attitude 
towards A-ing: it is no longer one of intending (1995, 23). According to Mele, 
best judgment is “the best judgment with a corresponding intention” (Ibid., 19).
Intentions are one thing and evaluative judgments another. Mele states that the 
conduct at issue is intentional conduct, and intentional conduct depends on its 
occurrence in the presence of intentions. He has argued that an action-guiding 
function to evaluative judgment does not devote one to suppose that the judg-
ments are themselves logically or causally sufficient for the presence of corre-
sponding intentions. In this context, Mele adds that  one can say that our best 
judgments are capable of influencing intentions formation  even though they do 
not uniformly give rise to intentions. Focusing on the judgements,   it may seem 
that we have just two things to work with - the contents of the judgments and the 
judging attitude toward those contents (Ibid., 25).
Mele believes that all best judgments have a motivational dimension. Akratic 
action against such judgments would be irrational (Ibid., 26). There are many 
normal agents who may have a generic, standard desire to act as they judge best. 
They may desire generically to do whatever they judge best. Such a desire would 
dispose them to intentions in accordance with their best judgment. Mele states 
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that a best judgment is a “best belief” (Ibid., 28). Sometimes, best judgments 
would be distinguishable from best beliefs.
From a general understanding, self-control can be exercised against both antic-
ipated temptation and present temptation (Ibid., 32). Every case of intentional 
action is a case of motivated action. Motivation is required specifically for intel-
ligent or learned behavior, not for behavior in general (e.g., the mating behavior 
of flies). Motivation is required for the capacity to learn strategic behavior by way 
of reward and punishment. In this context, memory is required, but memory is 
distinguishable from motivation. Memory enables a being to form and retain an 
associative link between a particular type of behavior and its consequent reward, 
whereas motivation disposes a being to seek out certain kinds of consequences 
and to seek to avoid other kinds (Ibid., 35–36).
Decisive best judgments are subject to defeat by opposing motivation and are 
supportable by exercises of self-control. Consider a case where an agent judges 
it best to do A, but wants to do B, where A and B are compatible acts. Thus he 
may reasonably be seen to act in accordance with the stronger desire in exercising 
self-control to resist B. For example, a man with limited funds may want to see 
an expensive play in a theatre more than he wants to see a movie, but would also 
prefer to see a movie and eat dinner at a restaurant more than he would like to see 
the play. He may realize that given his financial situation, he cannot see the play 
and eat dinner at a restaurant. Unless a desire is irresistible, it is subject to the 
agent’s control (Ibid., 42–44). For instance,
Ian turned on the television about half an hour ago when he started eating 
lunch. He decided to have a quick meal so that he would have time to fin-
ish painting his shed before his wife came home from work. Ian has just 
finished eating and he is thinking that he ought to get back to work now. 
However, he is enjoying the golf tournament on TV and he remains seated. 
He tells himself that he will watch until the next commercial break, but the 
commercial comes and goes and Ian is still in front of the set. Thinking that 
he had better drag himself away from the television now, Ian utters this self-
command: “Get off your butt, Ian, and paint that shed!” Ian turns off the set, 
picks up his painter’s cap, and walks into his backyard.
Strict akratic actions are motivated by resistible desires, and if self-control can-
not be exercised against preponderant proximal temptations, such temptations are 
irresistible (Ibid., 55). Our capacity for control over our desires extends even to 
proximal desires, including many proximal desires to A that compete with our 
decisive better judgments and are stronger than our proximal desires not to A. 
Agents who lack a capacity for control over a desire that competes with their 
decisive better judgment are cut off from autonomy in that connection.
Mele’s view of akrasia is based on two principles, in which he argues: (1) one 
can manifest akrasia by performing an act that coincides with one’s best judg-
ment, and (2) one can exercise self-control on behalf of an act that goes against 
one’s best judgment (Ibid., 60). He cites an instance:
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Young Bruce has decided to join some wayward cub scouts in breaking into a 
neighbor’s house, even though he decisively judges it best not to do so. Sup-
pose that at the last minute Bruce refuses to enter the house and leaves the 
scene of the crime. His doing so because his decisive judgment has prevailed 
is one thing; his refusing to break in owing simply to a failure of nerve is 
another. In the latter event, Bruce has arguably exhibited weakness of will; he 
‘chickened out’.
In the above case, Bruce experiences some trepidation about breaking into the house 
and tries to steel himself for the deed. Although he has exhibited strength of will, 
some exercises of self-control are not performed in the service of a best judgment.
We can exercise self-control in support of decisive better judgments that derive 
from our appetites, emotional commitments, and continent and incontinent behav-
ior, which might be viewed as outcomes of ‘intellect and passion’. Self-control is 
the ability to master motivation that opposes one’s intentions or decisions: an agent 
can display self-control in abandoning an intention. An agent may exercise self-con-
trol in support of his making a decision or intention that fits his better judgment 
(Ibid., 61–62). To say that ‘S’ performed an akratic action is not to say that ‘S’ is 
an akratic person. Just as a generally honest person can lie without properly being 
branded a liar, someone can act akratically without properly being termed an akratic 
person. Hence, the above example of Bruce’s participation in a break-in can be an 
akratic deed without inferring that he is an akratic boy. After all, Bruce may exhibit 
considerable strength of will in mastering the fear that opposes his decision. Better 
judgments may be based on and supported by passions, emotions, appetites, etc. But 
in some instances, akrasia may issue in the long term or even permanent modifica-
tions of one’s conception of the good life. Akratic reasoning can also influence one’s 
better judgments more directly, without altering one’s conception of the good life.
There are mainly two conditions under which the displayed self-control of a per-
son is true: (1) an agent’s displaying self-control does not depend on his being a self-
controlled person. Even a minimally self-controlled person may display the powers 
of self-control that he has, and (2) exercises of self-control oppose something in sup-
port of something else, e.g., an agent exercises self-control in opposing motivation 
that threatens to generate conduct, that is contrary to his better judgment (Ibid., 64).
An agent is akratic if and only if his performance involves the defeat of a higher-
order desire by a lower-order one. The full range of continent and incontinent action 
can be captured only by viewing the possession of second-order desires of a certain 
kind as essential to each. In “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” 
Harry Frankfurt has given more importance to the notion of a second-order desire. 
According to his account, a person “has a desire for the second order either when 
he wants simply to have a certain desire or when he wants a certain desire to be his 
will” (Frankfurt 1971, 10). Wanting a certain desire to be one’s will is, wanting that 
desire “to be the desire that moves effectively to act”. Such a second-order desire 
Frankfurt terms a “second-order volition”. For him, both second-order desires and 
volitions are indisputable. Sometimes, we can find that if continent action were to 
require intentionally resisting desires, continent action would seem to be essentially 
tied to higher-order desires.
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Now we can see how belief plays a crucial role in the following context. Biased 
beliefs are divided into two general categories, unmotivated and motivated. Psy-
chologists have identified a number of sources of unmotivated biased belief, such 
as vividness of information, heuristic availability, confirmation bias, and tendency 
to search for causal explanations. These sources are capable of functioning indepen-
dently of motivation. For example, motivation can enhance the vividness or salience 
of certain data. Motivation can bias our beliefs; there might be a place for doxas-
tic self-control in our lives. It depends on whether motivation can bias our beliefs 
relative to our own doxastic standards or principles, or whether we are capable of 
exercising self-control in such a way as to moderate the effects of motivation on the 
belief (1995, 86–88).
Akratic action manifests weakness of will, or at least an associated imperfection. 
Similarly, continent action manifests self-control. Akrasia is a deficient capacity to 
contain or restrain one’s desires. Continent belief requires self-control. The agent 
who performs a strict akratic action acts against a consciously held better judgment. 
What sorts of better judgment might be violated in cases of akratic belief or served 
by an exercise of self-control instances of continent belief? There are two possibili-
ties: J1 is the judgment that it is best not to allow what one wants to be the case to 
determine what one believes (P) is the case, e.g., non-strict akratic belief—belief 
formation, belief retention, and belief revision. J2 is the judgment that it is best to 
believe that (P), e.g., strict akratic belief.
There are two central ranges of cases for characterizations of non-strict akratic 
and continent believing (Ibid., 94). First, a central range of cases of non-strict 
akratic believing is constituted by instances of motivated believing that (1) violate 
a doxastic principle that the believer ‘S’ either explicitly believes to be correct or 
undeniable implicitly accepts, which principle is not in competition with any other 
principle of ‘S’ and (2) were suitably avoidable by ‘S’ by means of an employment 
of self-control. Second, a central range of cases of non-strict continent believing is 
constituted by instances of believing that (1) accord with a doxastic principle that 
the believer ‘S’, either explicitly believes to be correct or undeniably implicitly 
accepts, the principles that are not in competition with any other principles of S, and 
that (2) were suitably promoted by S’s exercising self-control.
In Irrationality, Mele talks about self-deception, and discusses some common 
ways in which desire can lead to biased belief in cases of self-deception, such as 
negative misinterpretation, positive misinterpretation, selective evidence gathering, 
selective focusing, or attending. He also claims that ‘self-deception commonly is not 
intentional’ (Ibid., 95–96). Just as traditionally conceived akratic actions are dis-
tinguished from compelled actions performed against the agent’s better judgment, 
akratic feelings conceived are also uncompelled. Like akratic beliefs, akratic feel-
ings are not akratic actions; a proper conception of akratic feeling must accommo-
date the difference. The preceding remarks suggest the following characterization of 
strict akratic feeling (Ibid., 102–105):
S’s being or remaining in a feeling-state, x during t is an instance of strict 
akratic feeling if and only if S’s being or remaining in x during t is uncom-
pelled, and during t, S consciously holds a judgment to the effect that there is 
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good and sufficient reason for his not being or remaining in x, again feeling-
states include states of not having certain feelings.
Strict akratic feeling necessarily derives from the strict akratic action. Specifically, 
a strict akratic action associated with one’s not bringing one’s feelings in line with 
one’s better judgment. Strict akratic actions violate practical better judgments, judg-
ments about what it would be best to do or refrain from doing.
Values (intrinsic and extrinsic) are trickier (Ibid., 118). An agent intrinsically 
values X if and only if he values X for its own sake, or as an end. Some things 
are valued both as ends and as means. For example, Pujarini values daily exercise 
both for its own sake and because it is conducive to good health. We can distinguish 
between intrinsic and extrinsic values. X is among person S’s intrinsic values if and 
only if X is among S’s values and S intrinsically values X—for example, justice is 
one of Pujarini’s intrinsic values if and only if justice is among her values and she 
intrinsically values justice. Similarly, X is among S’s extrinsic values if and only 
if X is among S’s values and S extrinsically values X: physical fitness is a value of 
Pujarini’s and she values it as a means to happiness. In the case of valuing, the same 
personal value can be both intrinsic and extrinsic: Pujarini may value physical fit-
ness both as a means to happiness and for its own sake.
Mele states that the ideally self-controlled person will not assign value akrati-
cally. People can revise or embrace their values on the basis of principled reflection, 
but the principles that inform reflections can themselves be shaped by their values. 
The ideally self-controlled person perfectly manifests what Mele calls perfect self-
control, which has four dimensions (Ibid., 121–122):
1. Range Perfect self-control is perfectly global. It is manifested in overt actions, 
mental actions, intentions, beliefs, and emotions, in practical reasoning and deci-
sive better judgments, and in the assessment, acceptance, and revision of values 
and principles. It has a maximal categorical range.
2. Object The ideally self-controlled person has never exercised self-control errantly, 
but only in support of “pure” items that non-akratically hold decisive better judg-
ments, values, principles, and the like. The objects of exercises of self-control in 
the ideally self-controlled person are perfect.
3. Frequency The ideally self-controlled person exercises self-control whenever he 
reflectively deems it appropriate to do so.
4. Effectiveness The ideally self-controlled person’s exercise of self-control always 
succeeds in supporting what they are aimed at supporting. They are perfectly 
effective. This is not a matter of luck or causal deviance; rather it is the ideally 
self-controlled person consistently and intentionally bringing about the success 
of his exercises of self-control.
Part II
Personal autonomy is a property of a person, e.g., values, principles, beliefs, desires, 
intentions, and plans. For Mele, ‘psychological autonomy’ is an autonomy with 
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regard to various aspects of one’s mental or psychological life, including one’s pro-
attitudes, e.g., one’s values and desires. There are three distinguishable species of 
autonomy that agents may enjoy with respect to their pro-attitudes: (1) developing—
an agent autonomously developing a pro-attitude over a stretch of time, (2) possess-
ing—an agent autonomously possessing a pro-attitude during a stretch of time, and 
(3) influencing—an agent being autonomous with respect to the influence of a pro-
attitude on his intentional behavior (Ibid., 138).
There are at least two capacities involved in personal autonomy, namely (1) outer-
directedness, i.e., one’s environment, and (2) inner-directedness, e.g., capacity for 
decision-making, critical reflection on one’s values, principles, preferences, and 
beliefs. Both types of capacity have at least a partly psychological basis (Ibid., 144). 
Psychological autonomy has two types of conception. One is the externalist perspec-
tive: there is more to being psychologically autonomous over a stretch of time than 
what goes on inside a person during that time. The psychological autonomy of some 
individuals also depends on how they came to possess the values and desires that 
guide self-reflection and decision-making, and this also depends on agents’ causal 
histories. The other is the internalist perspective: the history is relevant only insofar 
as it yields functional capacities for such things as decision-making, self-reflection, 
identification, and self-modification (Ibid., 146).
Mele views P-autonomy (for ‘possession’) as autonomy regarding the possession 
of a pro-attitude that one has an integral psychological autonomy (Ibid., 149). There 
are a number of points about ability on which compatibilists and incompatibilists 
can agree, such as (1) the ability to do A intentionally has a representational dimen-
sion, e.g., John currently has no representation of a means of impressing his new 
neighbors, and it has not even occurred him to try to impress them; (2) the ability to 
do A intentionally has a motivational dimension, e.g., John now has no motivation 
to leave his office soon, because he is in the midst of a thoroughly enjoyable pro-
ject. But if there is no bar to his acquiring such motivation, he is intentionally able 
to leave his office soon, (3) the ability to do A intentionally has a distinct executive 
dimension, e.g., owing to illness, (4) the ability (during t) to A intentionally (during 
t)  often is contingent upon environmental conditions, e.g., John who knows how to 
play tennis (during t). He may be stranded in a desert, miles from the nearest tennis 
equipment and so, he has the relevant motivation and executive properties may be 
unable to play tennis (Ibid., 149–150).
Mele argues that autonomous possession of a pro-attitude requires authentic-
ity regarding that pro-attitude.  Similarly, Joel Feinberg, in his book Harm to Self 
(1986, 33), writes:
A person is authentic to the extent that … he can and does subject his opinions 
and tastes to rational scrutiny. He is authentic to the extent that he can and 
does alter his convictions for reasons of his own and does this without guilt or 
anxiety…. He will select his lifestyle to match his temperament, and his politi-
cal attitudes to fit his ideals and interests.
For Feinberg, autonomy does not entail being a wholly self-made person. The ide-
ally self-controlled agent is not infected by akrasia. In chapter 5 (Self-control and 
Belief), Mele characterized an ideally self-controlled person is that which he wants 
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to be, and his influences are what he believes to be true, albeit only in the ways 
permitted by his principles (one’s subjective beliefs on one’s own principles). Since 
deliberation is partly a matter of belief formation, including the formation of evalu-
ative beliefs about prospective courses of action, and the observation applies to the 
deliberation of ideally self-controlled individuals, such individuals will not akrati-
cally violate their deliberative principles, which are the principles concerning how 
they should conduct their deliberation. Ideally self-controlled deliberators need not 
be perfect deliberators (1995, 178).
The non-autonomy of an agent with respect to a deliberative process is explicable 
in two ways: (a) facts about the input to deliberation, and (b) facts about what the 
agent does and is capable of doing with that input. Even an agent possessed of ideal 
self-control can have some compelled pro-attitudes. Such pro-attitudes can function 
as input to deliberation, rendering the agent non-autonomous with respect to a par-
ticular deliberative episode. An ideally self-controlled person can be cut off from 
autonomous deliberation, and the autonomous deliberation is handled by the attribu-
tion of authenticity to an agent.
We have a psychological autonomous agent if the following three conditions 
are met (Ibid., 187): (1) the agent has no compelled motivational states or some 
coercively produced motivational states, (2) the agent’s beliefs are conducive to 
informed deliberation about all matters that concern him, and (3) the agent is a reli-
able deliberator. These are not the necessary conditions for psychological autonomy, 
but they are sufficient for such autonomy. Mele has not offered a compatibilist anal-
ysis of autonomy, but he has advanced a compatibilist set of sufficient conditions 
for psychological autonomy, and it is supplemented to provide sufficient conditions 
for autonomous action, which excludes covert non-constraining (CNC) control by 
another agent. A CNC controller can operate on three agential fronts (Ibid.): (1) the 
victim’s motivational attitudes, (2) the victim’s informational attitudes, and (3) the 
victim’s executive qualities. The satisfaction of the “compatibilist trio” of conditions 
suffices for the absence of CNC control by another agent on each of these fronts. 
Robert Kane (1989) argues that no compatibilist account adequately addresses the 
possibility of certain sorts of manipulation. He has argued that compatibilism can-
not give a good response to the possibility of ‘CNC control.’ Mele discusses vari-
ous cases of CNC control and argues that his conditions provide a good response 
to Kane’s challenge to compatibilism. However, Mele further points out his view in 
two ways: First, the CNC control problem can be handled by compatibilists. They 
can offer plausible compatibilist grounds for the judgment that agents manipulated 
by a CNC controller in representative cases do not conduct themselves autono-
mously. Second, the CNC control problem can be handled by them in a way that not 
only provides sufficient conditions for the absence of causality determining CNC 
control over a specified choice (or decisive better judgment, or intention) but also 
provides sufficient conditions for the absence of autonomy-blocking CNC control 
that leaves various relevant options open.
There are both advantages and disadvantages to autonomy. Compatibilist (soft-
determinist) belief in autonomy can help to render secure our belief in ourselves as 
autonomous agents, whereas an agent cannot be autonomous if each agent-internal 
state or event and the other is the product of some deterministic causal chain. The 
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advantage of incompatibilist belief in autonomy (libertarian sense of free will)  is 
that it can accommodate the intuition (i.e., an agent is not autonomous if his states 
and actions are the result of any deterministic factors) with the agent’s having ulti-
mate responsibility and control. However, the advantages of agnostic autonomism 
(agnostic about compatibilism belief in autonomy) are that it does not insist that 
autonomy is compatible with determinism, nor does it insist that we are internally 
indeterministic in a way that is of use to libertarians. With regard to its disadvan-
tages, (1) no set of sufficient conditions for compatibilist autonomy is sufficient for 
autonomy, and (2) human beings are not internally indeterministic in a way that is 
theoretically useful to incompatibilist believers in autonomy. The advantage of non-
autonomism is that no human being is autonomous, and its disadvantage is that it 
must provide a convincing argument for incompatibilism and convincing grounds 
for the thesis that human beings are not internally indeterministic in a way that is 
required for incompatibilist autonomy (Ibid., 252–253). Lastly, Mele accepts agnos-
tic autonomism, i.e., both compatibilism and libertarianism; the agnostic autonomist 
may believe that if internal indeterminism is not actually obtained, then compatibi-
lism is true.
My Views on Mele’s Understanding of Autonomy and Self‑control
With regard to this book, I want to stress that an autonomous agent has some sort of 
agential power, whereas self-control is necessary to enhance the agent’s autonomy. I 
do argue that an ideally self-controlled person does not lack autonomy, because he is 
not always trying to control only the continent and incontinent behaviours, actions, 
and feelings. Someone’s power of “control” is grounded in his own personal auton-
omy and without personal autonomy, that agent cannot control himself with respect 
to executing any kind of continent acts. For example, Pujarini is an ideally self-con-
trolled person, and she knows how to control or hold her anger in public places; for 
executing such an act, she should be an autonomous person with a strong capacity 
or power to control her anger attitudes. I would prefer to express  that in the case of 
an intentional action, both self-control and autonomy are merged, that is, there is an 
essential connection between these two notions. It seems that both autonomy and 
self-control are necessary conditions for exercising any kind of intentional action.
I shall claim  that there is a very close relationship between ‘autonomy and 
moral responsibility,’ on the one hand, and ‘self-control and moral responsibil-
ity,’ on the other hand. In general, moral responsibility requires an autonomous 
agent and a self-controlled person, but it does not encompass that all events for 
which one is morally responsible at a time during which should be an autono-
mous agent or a  self-controlled person. One can  contend that an agent is not 
morally responsible for an act—and may be only responsible for that act—at 
some relevant time, even if that agent is an autonomous agent and/or a self-
controlled person. The relevant time need not be while an agent is actively pur-
suing an end. It may be a time during which an agent passively neglects to do 
something; it may be the time of ‘not-doing’. For an instance, an autonomous 
agent may be morally responsible for not making an effort to save a child he sees 
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drowning and for the child’s death by drowning. Similarly, a lifeguard who care-
lessly falls asleep at his post may be morally responsible for the drowning of a 
swimmer in his charge. If the lifeguard were not an autonomous agent or not a 
self-controlled person, then he would not be morally responsible (rather we can 
say only responsible) for the drowning. I think, one’s notion of moral responsi-
bility will encompass not only one’s notion of free will or continent feelings and 
behavior, but also some notion of moral significance where one can determine 
some notion of what morality is. Thus there is an intimate relationship between 
autonomy, self-control, and moral responsibility.
What I have noted in this book is that Mele is trying to build a bridge between 
reason and passion in the case of decision-making or better judgement. Con-
sider the example of emotion. Emotions play an important motivational role in 
our lives and we have the power/ability to control our emotions or other affec-
tive feelings, that is,  how we respond or react on them. In many cases, our emo-
tions are the  product of our desires, habits of interpretation, learned patterns 
of emotional response, other affectives, and physiological conditions. Similarly, 
a self-controlled individual who is characteristically guided by his better judg-
ments, even in the face of strong competing motivation, does not devoid of emo-
tion or passion. As I have already   discussed  in part I regarding Mele’s view 
that  the ‘human being is more holistic  in nature, and the self of self-control is 
not exactly identified with reason; it is preferable to be identified with the per-
son or agent (my word)’ (Ibid., 6). Therefore, we claim that self-control can be 
exercised in support of better judgment, based in part on a person’s appetites and 
emotional commitments, as well.
I have noted that Mele’s better judgment is a general human tendency, i.e., 
the human attitude, especially one that favors one alternative over others. As we 
are  existential, emotional, social, rational, and selfish human beings, we need 
beneficial or profitable options over the alternatives, and for that we are always 
giving more priority to the better judgment which is decided by our reason, 
desire, belief, emotion, or whatever we feel pleasurable, according to the differ-
ent perspectives. We all want to fulfill our own desires throughout the course of 
our lives—a seemingly infinite series of our good or bad desires.
Finally, I would prefer to articulate  that ‘being a self-controlled person is 
a necessary capacity or ability of being an autonomous person’, instead of Mele’s 
view that ‘being a self-controlled person is insufficient for being an autonomous 
person’. Consider an example  that Pujarini is a self-controlled person who can 
control everything in the sphere of her life, but she has no autonomy to act. In 
this context, do you think that she is really a self-controlled person who has no 
autonomy? I would say “NO” because on the one hand, controlling one’s desire 
over others is a power of a self-controlled person, and on the other hand, that 
power of “trying” itself has some sort of autonomy, and we cannot ignore this 
kind of attempting of the mental act. I cannot, hence, support Mele’s definition 
of an autonomous person is a self-controlled person and not vice-versa. If we 
agree on Mele’s view in this context, I think that it will be seen as a paradox in 
itself.
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Conclusion
The concept of “autonomy” suggests any uncompelled, uncoerced, intentional action 
of a self-conscious and self-reflective agent, and it may be held that all such actions 
are free unless there are some freedom-blocking properties, such brainwashing, com-
pulsion, coercion, insanity, or relevant deception. An autonomous agent and self-con-
trolled person are involved in self-reflection, self-assessment, careful deliberation, and 
successful attempts at self-modification. Free agents are first and fundamentally free 
with respect to what they do.
Self-control is not only exhibited in behavior that is in accordance with the agent’s 
better judgment in our thinking, but is also that which can be or ought to be exercised 
because it is exhibited in both motivational and evaluative ways. It can be exercised in 
order to balance one’s motivations with one’s better judgment, and is also encouraged 
by one’s own rational evaluation based on both intrinsic and extrinsic desires. I would 
say that the autonomous agent and self-controlled person have the power to make 
choices which can only and ultimately be explained in terms of their own self-will, i.e., 
character-traits, motives, and efforts.
Last, but not least, this book, Autonomous Agent: From Self-Control to Autonomy, 
is meticulously written and well-argued from both a philosophical and psychological 
perspective. It would be more effective for those scholars who are interested in the phi-
losophy of action, especially regarding free will, agency, self-control, moral responsi-
bility, and akrasia. I highly appreciate Alfred Mele’s philosophical argumentation, vast 
literary contributions, and academic intellectual depth.
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